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Abstract
In this article, we discuss the democratic conditions for parliamentary oversight in EU foreign affairs. Our point of depar-
ture is two Interinstitutional Agreements (IIAs) between the Council and the European Parliament (EP), which provide the
latter with access to sensitive documents. To shed light on this issue, we ask to what extent these contribute to the demo-
cratic accountability in EU foreign policy? It is argued that the IIAs have strengthened the EP’s role in EU foreign affairs by
giving it access to information to which it was previously denied. This does not mean, however, that this increase in power
equals a strengthening of the EP as a democratic accountability forum. First of all, both IIAs (even if there are differences
between them) fail to maximise the likelihood that the plurality of views in the EP as a whole is reproduced. Secondly, and
more importantly, the EU citizens are largely deprived of opportunities to appraise how their elected representatives have
exercised their role as guardians of executive power.
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1. Introduction
When it comes to foreign policy, most parliaments play
a very different role compared to other areas of public
policy. Historically, foreign policy was a royal prerogative,
and it still is largely in the hands of the executive branch.
So too in the European Union (EU), where national gov-
ernments tend to dominate the making of foreign policy,
particularly in the area of the Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy (CFSP). Avoiding constraints of democratic
procedures is one reason for moving foreign policy deci-
sions to the EU-level (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). Foreign
policy is rarely enacted through legislation, which con-
tributes to reducing parliamentary involvement, and in
the EU, the treaty explicitly excludes legislation from the
CFSP (Article 24, Treaty on European Union [TEU]). Ac-
cess to information is another major obstacle for parlia-
ments in this field. Because executives own most of the
information—whether about operational plans or inter-
national negotiations—it creates an informational asym-
metry that disadvantages parliaments. In the words of
Raunio and Wagner (2017, p. 9), in the area of foreign
policy, “much of parliamentary activity focuses on get-
ting timely and accurate information”. Without appropri-
ate information it is difficult for parliamentarians to hold
the executive to account, particularly regarding activities
within international organizations.
At the EU-level, the European Parliament (EP) is bet-
ter placed than national parliaments to monitor and
oversee the Union’s foreign policy activities because it
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is in regular contact with the EU-executives.1 According
to Article 36, TEU, the EP shall be consulted on the main
aspects and basic choices of the CFSP, and is entitled to
be informed about how those policies evolve. After the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has to give
consent to international agreements, and as a corollary,
is to be informed at all stages of the decision-making pro-
cedure (Article 218(10)) (see Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017,
in this issue).2 Neither article is explicit about the scope
or depth of the EP’s right to information. Therefore, the
EP hasmade an effort to impose its own interpretation of
the Parliament’s right to information, mostly against con-
siderable opposition frommember states, but oftenwith
at least some success (Rosén, 2015, 2017). In this article,
we assess two key agreements that have given the EP ac-
cess to documents in external relations, and ask: to what
extent do these contribute to the democratic accountabil-
ity of EU foreign policy?
As one of the main indicators of democratic quality,
accountability signifies the extent to which EU institu-
tions “can be—and are—held to account by democratic
forums” (Bovens, Curtin, & t’Hart, 2010, p. 5). Parlia-
ments are popularly elected and well suited to perform
this task, but parliamentary involvement should not au-
tomatically be equated with democracy. One also has
to assess the quality of the arrangement for access to
information in order to judge if these really enhance
the preconditions for democracy (cf. Stie, 2013). Based
on a deliberative reading of democracy, we have dis-
cerned three dimensions of accountability relations to
evaluate the agreements and the practices they give rise
to: First, the interinstitutional relations between the EP
and the executive, secondly the intrainstitutional rela-
tions within the EP itself, and thirdly, the relationship
between the EP and the EU citizens. More specifically,
we look at two Interinstitutional Agreements (IIAs) that
the EP and the Council have concluded on access to doc-
uments. In 2002, they agreed an IIA concerning access
by the EP to sensitive information of the Council in the
field of security and defence policy.3 This agreement
established an arrangement whereby five Members of
the EP (MEPs) can peruse documents that the Council
finds necessary to withhold from the public. A decade
later, subsequent to the changes in the Lisbon Treaty,
another IIA was concluded, this time on access to clas-
sified documents held by the Council on matters except
CFSP.4 Through this agreement information is available
to a broader range of MEPs, albeit limited to members
of the relevant committee as well as other specialised
EP bodies.5
As shown below, these agreements raise diffi-
cult dilemmas when viewed as potential vehicles for
democratisation of EU foreign policy. These pertain
mainly to the internal relationship between those MEPs
who get, and those who do not get, access to confiden-
tial information and to the relationship between the EP
and Union citizens. We argue that how these relation-
ships are organised and practiced affect the normative
authority by which the EP can claim to speak on behalf
of its electorate. Given that there are a series of strings at-
tached to accessing these documents, what is the demo-
cratic net-worth of such IIAs to the EP?
2. Assessing the Democratic Credentials of the
Interinstitutional Agreements: An Analytical
Framework
Secrecy in foreign policy is often claimed to be required
to protect national security and interests of the state
(Hill, 2003). However, the inherent threat of secrecy is
that it “obstructs the standard mechanisms for oversight
utilized by representative democracies—elections, pub-
lic opinion and deliberation” (Curtin, 2014, p. 4). In a
democracy, access to information is a “precondition for
the establishment and maintenance of realistic account-
ability mechanisms” (Stie, 2013, p. 44). Although one
could argue that there are legitimate reasons to keep se-
crets in foreign policy, if parliaments are to hold the exec-
utive to account, they need access to information, includ-
ing sensitive documents. How, then, can we go about as-
sessing whether the IIAs strengthen the accountability
mechanisms in EU foreign policy?
Bovens et al. (2010, p. 35) define accountability as
a social “relationship between an actor and a forum,
in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to
justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose ques-
tions and pass judgment, and the actor may face conse-
quences”. Because we want to analyse whether the IIAs
have strengthened the EP as a democratic accountabil-
ity forum, we apply a democratic reading of this defini-
tion, where accountability requires popular control with
decision-making, and can only bemet if “an arrangement
or regime enables democratically legitimized bodies to
monitor and evaluate executive behaviour and to induce
executive actors to modify that behaviour in accordance
with their preferences” (Bovens et al., 2010, p. 54). From
this definition, we derive the normative benchmarks and
dimensions applied in the analysis.
In this article, we have developed an analytical frame-
work anchored in the tradition of deliberative democ-
1 Who the main executive is depends on the policy area. For the CFSP it is mainly the Council and the European External Action Service, while for other
areas of external relations, the Commission is a key executive actor together with the Council. We do not include national parliaments in the current
analysis because they mainly have the possibility to control their respective national governments. Being situated at the EU-level, the EP can hold the
Council as a whole to account.
2 CFSP-agreements do not require consent, but the EP is to be kept informed throughout negotiations.
3 OJ 2002/C298/01.
4 OJ 2014/C095/01.
5 We have chosen to focus on the agreements between the Council and the EP. This does not mean that we disregard the executive roles of the Com-
mission or the European External Action Service (EEAS). However, the Council still holds a firm grip on policy-making in EU foreign affairs, especially
security and defence policy, and is therefore an important, but also difficult agent, for the EP to hold to account.
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 51–61 52
racy. Here democracy is understood as “a form of gov-
ernment in which free and equal citizens (and their rep-
resentatives), justify decisions in a process in which they
give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable
and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching con-
clusions that are binding in the present on all citizens
but open to challenge in the future” (Gutmann& Thomp-
son, 2004, p. 7; see also Forst, 2001). Bovens et al.’s def-
inition of accountability sits well with a deliberative ap-
proach as they are both structured around a practice
of justification. However, in the democratic reading, the
challenge is how to institutionalise decision-making pro-
cedures that are sufficiently open and accessible to the
viewpoints of affected parties so that those in govern-
ment do not become too independent and insulated
from input and scrutiny of the electorate. In represen-
tative systems, parliaments play an important role in es-
tablishing such a link between decision-makers and cit-
izens in the public sphere6 because they are founded
on the logic of contestation and discussion among di-
rectly elected politicians who represent a plethora of cit-
izens’ viewpoints. Even if parliaments fail to perfectly re-
produce the pluralism of viewpoints that exist in soci-
ety, they nevertheless represent the best institutional
approximation of how citizens can see themselves as au-
thors of the lawwithout directly participating in decision-
making themselves. Hence, when assessing the demo-
cratic accountability potential of the IIAs, the normative
benchmark of deliberative democracy requires that they
improve the EP’s possibilities to facilitate arenas where
the EU’s foreign policy can be critically scrutinised against
the plurality of societal viewpoints.What kind of account-
ability relationships this would require in more concrete
terms can be structured along three dimensions.
Firstly, it compels a democratically elected body out-
side the executive capable of scrutinizing and control-
ling its powers. Hence, a crucial feature of parliaments
in their function as accountability forums is their ability
to exercise oversight independently of the agent. This is
difficult as there is an inbuilt information asymmetry per-
taining to the fact that the executive is the “owner” of
secret information, not only because it initiates policies,
but also because it obtains information through intelli-
gence services and/or diplomatic channels.7 The basis
for being able to exercise control, is what Lester (2015,
p. 16) has identified as an issue of autonomy. This re-
quires that the accountabilitymechanisms “have an inde-
pendent and autonomous role from the overseen; that
they have a separate statutory basis for their operations,
and, thus, that their activities and decisions cannot be in-
fluenced by pressure from the overseen”. Crucially, this
entails the possibility that parliament can interrogate or
pass judgement on the executive, i.e. that holding to ac-
count has consequences or some form of sanctioning
power (cf. Bovens et al., 2010). For the EP, the ques-
tion is whether it possesses some form of parliamentary
censure or veto that it can impose on the executive (or
threaten with), if it strongly disagrees with the activities
executed. Or it can mean the possibility of judicial re-
view, i.e. the opportunity to appeal to the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union. Sanctions also encompass
less formal consequences—such as naming and shaming
through parliamentary questions that may have reputa-
tional costs (Bovens et al., 2010).
Secondly, the parliament draws its authority from
the fact that it is popularly elected and thus composed
according to a representative selection of viewpoints
among the electorate. To respect and reproduce this rep-
resentativity during the account-holding process is vital
in order to maximise the likelihood that all relevant view-
points are included. In addition, it minimises specula-
tions about the forum’s discussions being dominated by
private and strategic considerations rather than being
an arena where foreign policy is scrutinised and consid-
ered for its conduciveness to the public good (Chambers,
2004). To be able to pose meaningful questions, probe
intelligently into the executive’s activities and pass judge-
ment on behalf of the citizens, parliamentarians must
have access to relevant documents. However, in many
other countries, not all members of parliament have ac-
cess to confidential documents, and this is also the case
in the EU. In cases where the accountability forummeets
behind closed doors (Abazi, 2016), there is always the
risk that discussions become biased or narrow (cf. Cham-
bers, 2004). In these situations it is vital that the account-
holding situation is still subject to a critical and balanced
treatment from across the political spectrum of view-
points represented in the EP plenary. Hence, for a subset
ofMEPs to legitimately claim to act on behalf of the EP as
a whole, it will, at a minimum, have to somehow reflect
the overall composition of the chamber.
Thirdly, that parliament or a subset of parliamentar-
ians knows state secrets have little democratic value if
that information is not somehow shared with the public.
How else can parliamentarians claim to be speaking on
behalf of Union citizens? Consequently, although some
MEPs have privileged access to information, at some
point, they must demonstrate to their voters how they
have made use of that information to keep the execu-
tives in check. This would mean that the EP provides
the public with information on the reasoning behind de-
cisions (cf. Mansbridge, 2009). One could for instance
imagine that the EP has a plenary debate about the CFSP
where MEPs lay out the reasons for supporting/ not sup-
porting the EU’s activities. Based on these justifications,
members of the public can then assess whether they
think MEPs have done a satisfactory job keeping score
on the executive. In the case of particularly important—
or particularly contested—decisions, it may not suffice
that MEPs receive information in secluded fora. In some
6 Or between strong and weak publics as Nancy Fraser (1992) has termed it.
7 The principle of originator control is a further disadvantage to the EP because third parties, including member states, can decide not to disclose docu-
ments they have provided to the EU (Curtin, 2013).
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situations it may be necessary that the public is aware
of the positions and arguments of the different parties
involved in the decision-making process in order to be
able to reach an informed opinion.
Nevertheless, exceptions to the standard of trans-
parency can only be dealt with through special rules
which narrowly delineate how and when secrecy is jus-
tified. As these rules allow for secrecy, it is crucial that
they themselves have been vetted in a publicly accessi-
ble decision-making process prior to their application. In
the words of Thompson (1999, p. 185): “Secrecy is justi-
fiable only if it is actually justified in a process that itself
is not secret”. In the case of the IIAs, this means that the
rules for secrecy have been discussed in parliamentary
fora open to the public. Furthermore, rules and proce-
dures of secrecy—such as classification rules—should be
transparent (Curtin, 2013).
The three dimensions highlight inter-connected fea-
tures of the accountability relationship (1) between gov-
ernment branches; (2) between subsets of MEPs and the
EP as a whole; and finally (3) between the EP and Union
citizens, which together put us in a position to discuss
if the EP’s role as a democratic account-holder in for-
eign policy have been strengthened through the IIAs.8
In our analysis, we assess both the formal arrangements,
i.e. the text of the IIAs, and the practice resulting from
them. The data material consists of official documents
(EP-reports, parliamentary debates, minutes from the
Conference of Presidents in charge of the negotiations of
the IIA, as well as Council working documents and drafts).
In addition, 34 interviews with politicians and officials
from the EP, the EEAS, the Commission, and the Council
have been conducted.9
3. The Interinstitutional Agreements (IIAs)
Most IIAs are designed to facilitate cooperation be-
tween the EU institutions, but always within the bound-
aries of primary and secondary law (Eiselt & Slomin-
ski, 2006). Nevertheless, the substantive impact of such
agreements can be significant, and they are often sought
after by the EP in an attempt to carve out a greater role
for itself. With the development of EU’s security and de-
fence policy at the end of the 1990s and as a result of
the intention to exchange informationwith NATO, the EU
was put under pressure to reform its security regulations
(Reichard, 2006). The issue of how to protect sensitive EU
documents created two fractions with the EP and mem-
ber states who favoured a more open approach on one
side, and “states with a strong security interest” on the
other (Bjurulf & Elgström, 2004, p. 254). After two years
of negotiation, the IIA on access to sensitive information
in the field of security and defence policy was agreed
(Rosén, 2015). It established an arrangement where a
special committee of five MEPs gains access to sensi-
tive documents, i.e. documents classified as Top Secret,
Secret or Confidential. Documents can be requested by
the AFET-chairman or the EP-president, andmust be con-
sulted in camera. The members of the committee must
have security clearance and are not allowed to record
or share information. While some attempts have been
made to replace the 2002-IIA, the talks have been at a
standstill for several years, and the agreement is there-
fore still in use.
While the Lisbon Treaty did not entail any significant
changes for the EP’s role in the area of CSFP, it had mas-
sive implications for the EP’s role in deciding on EU in-
ternational agreements (Ripoll Servent, 2014). The EP
gained consent powers over “virtually any international
agreement…of any significance” (Corbett, 2012, p. 249),
and shall be fully informed at all stages of the negoti-
ations (Article 218(10), TFEU). After the Treaty entered
into force, however, the EP faced considerable opposi-
tion from the Council in implementing the new provi-
sions. One of the main contested issues was the pro-
tection of classified information. Not until the EP had
refused consent to two international agreements, with
reference to the lack of information they had received,
was a new IIA agreed in 2012. The agreement was not
implemented until 2014, awaiting the process of mak-
ing the EP’s security rules equivalent to those of the
Council (EP#12). The new IIA established an arrangement
where information is made available to a broader range
of MEPs, limited to members of the relevant committee
as well as other specialised EP bodies. Compared to the
2002-IIA on security and defence, the new arrangement
is held—at least by some—to bemore open in that more
MEPs gain access to information, instead of only a small,
preselected group (EP#6, EP#11).
4. Assessment: Have the IIAs Strengthened the EP as a
Democratic Accountability Forum?
4.1. Inter-Institutional Relationship between
Government Branches
The first dimension concerns the relationship between
government branches and addresses the extent to which
the IIAs have strengthened the EP’s autonomy and its
ability to control and check executive power. The 2002-
IIA applies to the area of security and defence policy
where supranational institutions, including the EP, have
few formal rights and where Council decision-making
processes largely take place behind closed doors. Taking
this as a starting point, it could be argued that the 2002-
IIA provides insight into parts of the EU’s security and
8 It should be noted that the IIAs do not in themselves establish complete accountability arrangements because they mainly deal with transparency and
do not involve a process of scrutiny as such. Hence, transparency should not be treated as coextensive with accountability (Bovens et al., 2010, p. 35),
but rather as a necessary (even if not sufficient) prerequisite for holding an actor to account (cf. Hood, 2010).
9 16 interviewees were from the EP (5 MEPs and 11 staff), 5 Commission staff, 4 from the Council secretariat, 6 from national delegations and 3 from
the EEAS. Interviews have been conducted between 2010–2017, in Brussels and over the telephone. All interviewees work with external relations, and
several have been involved with, or have closely observed, the negotiations of the two IIAs and/or the ensuing practice of the agreements.
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defence policy that would otherwise have remained se-
cret to the EP. According to one interviewee, prior to the
adoption of the 2002-IIA there was no other opportunity
to engage with the Council on classified issues (EP#6).
Others have described the agreement as “a substantial
step forward compared to treaty provisions on informing
the EP in terms of timing, scope and quality of informa-
tion” (Mittag, 2006, p. 15).
This point notwithstanding, a key criticism against
the 2002-IIA was that the Council might still decide to
withhold documents from the EP (EP#4). According to ar-
ticle 2(2) of the IIA, the EP shall be informed about the
content of any sensitive information “required for the ex-
ercise of the powers conferred on the European Parlia-
ment by the Treaty on European Union…taking into ac-
count the public interest”. Documents are disclosed at
the request of the EP, and in order to know which doc-
uments to ask for, a list that is also classified has to be
consulted (EP#6, EP#12). This makes it difficult to get
a complete overview of all the existing sensitive docu-
ments, andwhen one does not know of a document, one
cannot ask for it (EP#11). The 2002-IIA also says noth-
ing about how and who will judge which documents are
necessary in cases of conflict. While there are no direct
consequences if the Council decides not to respect the
IIA, the Council has to pick its battles, and behind the
Council’s decision to grant access to sensitive documents
was the ambition to preserve a good working relation-
ship with the EP (NAT#1). Because the Council has not
yet refused access to the EP, the arrangement has not
been put to the test, but the fact that documents are in
the Council’s possession weakens the EP’s autonomy (Re-
ichard, 2006).
Another aspect concerns the extent to which the
2002-IIA has increased the EP’s ability to interrogate or
pass judgement on the Council. Preliminary the answer
could be yes. The MEPs in the special committee re-
ceive regular oral briefings from the High Representative
(HR), during which the MEPs can express their opinions
on the Council’s activities and positions. In fact, rather
than accessing documents, the most frequent use of
the special committee has been for meetings with the
HR (EP#11). This practice was commenced under Javier
Solana, and has continued under Catherine Ashton and
Federica Mogherini. Here, MEPs have the opportunity to
ask several rounds of questions, and the arrangement has
been described as ‘very interactive’ as the HR engages
in answering questions and justifying positions (EP#6). In
other words, the special committee is not only informed,
but the Council via the HR, also explains and justifies its
activities. One could argue that since the special commit-
tee gains further insight into for instance details about
EU’s operations, it leaves them in a better position to
evaluate and judge the Union’s considerations and con-
duct, but there is still a lack of consequences should the
EP be dissatisfied with the arrangement. The constraints
on the EP’s autonomy emanating from the 2002-IIA be-
come even clearer when compared to the IIA from 2014.
The road to the 2014 agreement was a rocky one.
Shortly after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the
Commission and the EP agreed on a Framework Agree-
ment where a whole annex dealt with access to infor-
mation on international agreements, much according to
the EP’s preferences (Devuyst, 2014). To the EP, however,
it was important to receive information from the Coun-
cil, such as negotiation mandates, or agendas of Coun-
cil working group meetings, to be able to stay informed
about when and what the Council is debating (EP#12).
While the Parliament insisted that the negotiations in-
cluded all stages of the process—including the mandat-
ing period—the Council was adamant that the EP did
not have a role to play before the agreement was signed
(EP#9). During the negotiations on SWIFT, which was the
first international agreement subject to the new rules,
access to confidential documents was a key demand of
the EP (Meissner, 2016). Only a few weeks before the
EP refused its consent to SWIFT, the Council approached
it with a draft for a new IIA on access to classified doc-
uments. The draft was based on the 2002-IIA, whereby
a restricted number of MEPs could gain access to cer-
tain documents, on Council premises (Bornemann, Den-
zel, & Nadbath, 2014). With consent powers to back its
claims up, however, the EP did not accept all the Coun-
cil’s attempts to constrain access and was prepared to
use its new powers to push its will through if the Council
did not concede to its demands. As a result, the new IIA
contained a set of provisions closer to the EP’s position.
The EP was particularly pleased having obtained provi-
sions for access to classified information by staff, that
security clearance is not necessary for documents be-
low the level of EU confidential, and that “access will be
given as appropriate depending on the dossier, to rappor-
teurs, shadow rapporteurs or all committeemembers”.10
Thus, it is clear that the EP was able to set the premises
to a much greater extent in the case of the 2014-IIA,
compared to the 2002-IIA. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty
strengthened the EP’s ability to impose consequences, in-
cluding in the area of CFSP.
The EP has also twice taken the Council to the CJEU
in order to ensure it remains informed about negotia-
tions of CFSP-agreements.11 In both cases, the EP argued
that the Council had concluded agreements on transfer
of captured pirates—one with Mauritius and one with
Tanzania—without informing the EP. On both cases, the
Court ruled in favour of the EP, and annulled the agree-
ments on the grounds that the EP’s right to be informed
10 Report on the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament and the Council concerning the forwarding to and
handling by the European Parliament of classified information held by the Council on matters other than those in the area of the common foreign and
security policy, 18 July 2012.
11 Prior to the 2014-IIA, MEP int’Veld took both the Commission and the Council to Court—under the Regulation 1049/2001 on public access to
documents—for failure to disclose secret documents on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme re-
spectively (Abazi, 2015).
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had been violated.12 In its ruling, the Court underlined
that the Parliament’s right to be informed according to
Article 218(10) also applies to the CFSP, and that the rule
is “an expression of the democratic principles on which
the European Union is founded” (Parliament v. Council,
2011, para. 81). The EP and the Council appear to have
been interpreting the treaty, these recent judgements,
and the 2014-IIA differently. The Council is not prepared
to transmit documents automatically (see Hillebrandt,
2017, in this issue), which leads to a problem similar to
that of the 2002-IIA, where the EP has to know in ad-
vance which documents to request (EP#12, EP#13).13
Finally, being able to rely on the advise from staff is
crucial to the autonomy of theMEPs. Elected representa-
tives are rarely experts in particular fields, but politicians
with general knowledge. They need supporting staff who
can provide them with expert information to interpret
and decipher highly technical information. Generally, the
executive branch has direct access to a more compre-
hensive apparatus of in-house competence than parlia-
ments. This is even more acute in the EU where the EP is
reliant on information fromother actors such as the Com-
mission or NGOs, since its staff can be limited (EP#14,
see also Dobbels & Neuhold, 2014). When information is
classified, this asymmetry is further deepened as is con-
firmed by one of our interviewees: “when you are not
knowledgeable and know the area you are completely
lost” (EP#5). The 2002-IIA where access to sensitive in-
formation is exclusive to the five MEPs further illustrates
this point. Although staff is now allowed into the meet-
ings of the special committee, they are not allowed to
access sensitive documents (EP#11). The EP has tried to
alleviate this problem by selecting experienced MEPs to
sit in the special committee. For example, former French
general Phillippe Morillon was for several years a mem-
ber of the 2002-IIA special committee, and “probably got
access to more information than any other MEP would
have” (EP#1). In comparison, the 2014-IIA ismore accom-
modating as it allows access to parliament staff along
with the committeeMEPs, but only thosewho have been
designated in advance as need-to-know, and are secu-
rity cleared (Article 4(4)). MEPs who do not have such
staff available, can get frustrated because they are not
allowed to talk to their assistants after having read doc-
uments in the secure reading room. This makes their job
harder both because the documents are technical and
because it is difficult to know what is not included in
the documents (EP#10, EP#16). The presence of staff, al-
beit restricted, heightens the likelihood thatMEPs under-
stand and knowwhat they are looking at and thus makes
them better equipped to do their job as account-holders.
However, one could argue that a potential dilemma
remains: Even if some MEPs—be they few or more
numerous—are allowed to access classified documents,
this in itself is not enough to guarantee a democratic pro-
cess. One also has to assess to what extent they reflect
the overall composition of the EP as a whole.
4.2. Intra-Institutional Relationship between a Subset of
MEPs and the EP as a Whole
Parliaments are special because their core purpose is to
accommodate and voice a wide spectrum of views as
authorised through periodic elections. Hence, based on
the electoral outcome, their normative authority stems
from how successful they are in approximating and insti-
tutionalising this representative set of viewpoints—not
only when parliamentarians act as a collective in plenary
sessions, but also when they convene in smaller groups
and committees to conduct parliamentary tasks on be-
half of the body as a whole. Hence, the composition of
EP-committees and the conditions under which interac-
tion between plenary and committee meetings are or-
ganised are crucial in order to maximise the likelihood
that all relevant viewpoints are included in the commit-
tee discussions (Stie, 2013).
The arrangement in the 2002-IIA allows fiveMEPs ac-
cess to sensitive documents through participation in the
special committee. There is little open information—in
the IIA itself or in the EP’s rules of procedure—about
how and according to which criteria the Conference of
Presidents selects the members of the special commit-
tee.14 Based on the interviews, it seems that the EP’s
method has shifted slightly. There has for instance been
a heated debate about whether or not the chair of the
Security and Defence Committee should have a perma-
nent seat, as is the case for the AFET-chair. Furthermore,
although the goal has been a composition according to
party groups, there are indications of a more pragmatic
approach. As mentioned above, experienced MEPs have
been preferred in order to maximise the information
flow to the EP within the rather narrow limits of the IIA.
Even if it can be argued that the inclusion of experienced
and knowledgeable MEPs can be an important asset to
the special committee, knowledge and experience are al-
ways incomplete. It is thus vital to avoid that the selected
MEPs’ backgrounds are so similar that certain positions
get more attention and backing than if they had been
confronted with other viewpoints.
Against this background, it therefore seems unlikely
that it is possible to reproduce the plurality of views in
the EP as a whole during themeetings in the special com-
mittee. The problem is not necessarily that the special
committee is closed during session. In many cases ac-
countability can be saved bymaking the information from
the meetings known ex post, but because secrecy is not
temporary, the link between the open EP plenary and
committee settings, and the closed sessions of the spe-
12 C-658/11 and C-263/14.
13 As part of the new IIA on better law-making, the EP, Council and Commission have committed themselves to negotiate improved practices for
information-sharing in the context of the treaty as well as the recent Court-rulings (OJ 2016/L123/01).
14 One of the authors did obtain the names of the MEPs on the special committee by filing a request for document. So the information is not secret, but
hard to obtain.
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cial committee, is effectively disconnected. This represen-
tativity problem is exacerbated by the practice that the
2002-IIA has given rise to, where the HR also gives regu-
lar oral briefings to the special committee.15 If wemerely
apply an institutional power perspective, one could ar-
gue that despite restrictions, the development of this
practice has clearly strengthened the Council’s obligation
to inform the EP about matters concerning security and
defence. From a democratic perspective, however, the
problem is that the debates between the five MEPs and
the HR can be too narrow and fail to “reproduce the plu-
ralism of the public in the private” (Chambers, 2004, p.
390). As the special committee is not composed of a rep-
resentative selection of elected participants, neither the
plenary nor citizens can be sure that all possible positions
represented in Parliament as a whole have been voiced
and taken into consideration. The risk is that debates are
dominated by private reasons instead of public reasons
which means that the arguments presented are not ar-
guments that all could generally accept if they were pre-
sented in a publicly open debate (i.e. egoistic and self-
interested reasons). In this sense, the arrangement vio-
lates the representative nature of the EP. Interviewees
underline that the members of the special committee
can share some of the information they receive during
the oral briefings (EP#11). However, there are no clear
guidelines in the 2002-IIA itself, as opposed to the 2014-
IIA, where it is explicitly stated that classified information
“provided orally…shall be subject to the equivalent level
of protection” as written information (Article 6(5)). Fur-
thermore, information up to the level of EU Confidential
may be discussed in camera (Article 6(6)). Thus, on the
one hand, the members of the special committee get ac-
cess to much more information than is provided for ac-
cording to the 2002-IIA. On the other hand, it is not clear
just how far they are able to use that information beyond
the meetings in that particular committee.
The number of MEPs who are granted access to clas-
sified documents under the 2014-IIA—particularly when
it comes to documents below the category of Secret
and Top Secret—are at least higher than in security and
defence policy. Moreover, the latter agreement organ-
ises access to classified documents around the relevant
permanent committee and/or other specialised bodies
where the selection criteria are not only formally reg-
ulated and publicly available in the rules of procedure,
but also composed according to the numerical strength
of the political groups. This increases the likelihood that
committee meetings are not merely dominated by par-
ticular views, but reflective of the plurality of views in
the Parliament as a whole. In this sense, it can be argued
that the 2014-IIA has a stronger internal democratic an-
choring than the 2002-IIA. Having said this, it should be
noted that 2014-IIA favours some committee MEPs over
others, particularly rapporteurs and committee chairs.
This inbuilt inequality, which is prevalent in most of EU-
legislation, may skew discussions and let the positions
of the rapporteurs and committee chairs dominate over
other relevant viewpoints.
A recent study by van den Putte, de Ville and Orbie
(2015, p. 55) shows that not all the members of the In-
ternational Trade Committee (INTA) agree that they are
actually receiving the information they are entitled to:
“Liberal MEPs, who generally have a good relationship
with DG Trade…argue that they are treated in the same
way as the [Council’s Trade Policy Committee], while
more left-wingMEPs and the Greens believe that the dis-
closed information is rather vague and selective”. Sensi-
tive documents (for example, containing detailed Com-
mission negotiating positions), are only distributed to
a limited number of INTA members”. The negotiations
on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) between the EU and the US were a game changer,
particularly with regards to transparency.16 After heavy
criticism of the way in which the EU conducted the nego-
tiations with the US, the Commission launched its new
transparency strategy in November 2014 where it sug-
gested more extensive access to TTIP documents, a re-
view of the classification of trade information, and to
provide broad access to all MEPs (and where necessary
staff members).17 In the end, all MEPs could access doc-
uments pertaining to the TTIP negotiations.18 Even if, ac-
cording to Meissner (2016, p. 282), “the EP has never
been so well informed as in the TTIP negotiations”, there
is a remaining problem pertaining to what MEPs who
gain access can do with that information. Some have ar-
gued that the existing restrictions “prohibit governments
andMEPs from initiating a detailed analysis of the agree-
ment with their advisors and colleagues, as sharing in-
formation with third parties is strictly forbidden”.19 Thus,
although the access to information under the 2014-IIA is
advantageous compared to the 2002-IIA, the balance be-
tween parliamentary and public access is still a problem
for processes of democratic accountability.
4.3. Relationship between Accountability Forum and
Citizens—Parliamentary Versus Public Access
Democratic accountability hinges on the oversight body’s
ability to connect with and demonstrate to its principals,
15 This de facto extension of the function of the special committee has also never been publicly debated.
16 It should be noted, however, that although TTIP is expected to set a precedent for future negotiations, most interviewees underline the particularities
of these talks, and so far, there are few concrete changes made to the practices and procedures of other trade negotiations. International agreements
beyond trade is another matter, which is why the three main EU actors have started talks on a new IIA on access to documents concerning international
agreements.
17 Press release, Commission, 25 November 2014, retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2131_en.htm
18 Press release, INTA, 2 December 2015, retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20151202IPR05759/all-meps-to-have-
access-to-all-confidential-ttip-documents
19 MEP Heidi Hautala, 10 July 2014, retrieved from http://ttip2016.eu/blog/ttip%20ecj%20transparency.html
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i.e. the citizens, how it has conducted its role as demo-
cratic scrutiniser of executive power. As noted above,
democracy can accommodate some secrecy, the ques-
tion is how the IIAs strike the balance between secrecy
and transparency.
In the general legal framework on access to EU docu-
ments (Regulation 1049/2001), sensitive documents en-
compass information that protects “essential interests”
or specific areas, “notably public security, defence and
militarymatters”. According to one interviewee, the term
“notably” is like saying that “anything goes. It is very
open-ended and it could be misused” (EP#4). Other in-
terviewees argued that there is an acceptancewithin the
Parliament that this restrictive model can be justified for
security and defence, but not for other fields (EP#2).MEP
Brok, who negotiated the 2002-IIA for the Parliament, ar-
gued at the time that it was crucial to guarantee the nec-
essary secrecy of certain documents but that the rules
also had to maintain the level of transparency that the
public expects from parliament (EP-plenary, 5 Septem-
ber 2000). This illustrates the central dilemma in the
discussion about how to balance openness and secrecy:
“Democracy requires publicity, but some democratic poli-
cies…require secrecy” (Thompson, 1999, p. 182). Hence,
all sensitive documents should not be accessible, as
some information may seriously undermine the security
of the EU and its member states, and even mean that
lives are put at risk. Most national parliaments have par-
ticular provisions and procedures that protect sensitive
information. Thus, restraints in themselves need not be
undemocratic, but they have to be qualified.
This point has been meticulously demonstrated in
the recent work of Deidre Curtin (2013, 2014). She ar-
gues that in the EU there is “virtually no substantive
internal control to combat over-classification” (Curtin,
2013, p. 456). This is confirmed by some of our intervie-
wees, who argue that over-classification is becoming a
major problem (EP#4). If such a practice is widespread,
for whatever reasons, it undermines the terms on which
secrecy can be accepted in the first place. In institution-
alising secrecy rather than openness as default proce-
dure, the Council runs into a problem of how to justify
in whose name or on whose behalf it can legitimate and
maintain such a practice.20 To automatically classify doc-
uments without qualifying why this is necessary and rea-
sonable is incompatible with a democratic accountabil-
ity perspective, because the reasons for secrecy are in
themselves in need of scrutiny and justification (Cham-
bers, 2004, p. 389).
The 2002-IIAwas negotiated by a small teamofMEPs
and various presidencies, and when debated in plenary,
the terms were already settled. After MEP Brok had pre-
sented his report, therewas a short discussionwhere sev-
eral MEPs expressed their hesitations about the agree-
ment. MEP Martin said: “the way in which this has been
negotiated is not exactly exemplary, and the fact is that,
in the final analysis, we are faced with a take it or leave
it situation”. Curtin (2014, p. 692) has argued that “[t]he
procedure involved in such negotiations means that se-
crecy is applied to the process itself even when there
can be no issue of necessity to negotiate behind closed
doors for reasons of security or otherwise”. At the same
time, the Conference of Presidents, which consists of the
party groups chairs and the EP-president, mandated the
negotiations, and its (edited) minutes are publicly avail-
able. The Conference of Presidents is also representative
in the sense that it gives voice to all party groups in the
chamber. Nevertheless, although discussions about the
negotiations did not take place in total secrecy, Union cit-
izens were far from exposed to a publicly accessible de-
bate on if and when information can be kept secret. In
otherwords, the democratic problempertaining to these
decision-making processes is that they violate the prin-
ciple that (at some point) “the decision to keep a deci-
sion or policy secret should be made publicly” available
(Thompson, 1999, p. 193).
However, one thing is the procedure for reaching
agreement on justified secrecy, another challenge is to
exercise these rules in concrete policy situations. A for-
mer member of the 2002-IIA special committee de-
scribed its work as a “bad le Carré-novel” where they
were given secret documents—following the strict pro-
cedures of leaving mobile phones outside, not taking
notes—and then ended up receiving documents contain-
ing information that had already been made public in
the press. This is not something unique to the EU, most
parliaments have procedures for privileged access for se-
lected MPs. But the democratic problem that arises is
that (s)he is no longer at liberty to discuss the issues in
question neither with fellow MEPs nor in public if and
when (s)he receives the information in classified form.
The 2014-IIA creates a similar tension. The balance be-
tween parliamentary and public access to documents
and information is a dilemma that preoccupies several of
our interviewees from the EP. Those who are more prag-
matist argue that the EP’s ability to scrutinise the Coun-
cil’s external activities has greatly increased. The counter-
argument, from an idealist perspective, is that the Coun-
cil retains the upper hand—at the expense of democ-
racy. One interviewee emphasised that it is valuable to
be able to check that information from other sources is
correct, but that it can be difficult to discuss the same
issues freely afterwards—fearing that one might leak se-
cret information (EP#10).
At the end of the day, it is the EU citizens who will
judge. The recent debate on TTIP provides a good illus-
tration of what is at stake. While the transparency ini-
tiatives following the TTIP negotiations have made more
information accessible to the public at large, criticism
against the secluded character of the negotiations con-
tinue (see Coremans, 2017; Gheyle&DeVille, 2017; both
in this issue). This may be a consequence of the differ-
ent standards used to assess how much transparency is
enough. It can, however, also be taken as a sign that
20 For a counter argument, see Galloway (2014).
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Union citizens do not trust and accept that the Euro-
pean elites conduct entire negotiation processes behind
closed doors on trade deals that will greatly impact their
daily lives. In other words, theremay be situationswhere
the nature of the cases (e.g. if they are particularly con-
tested and/or if they directly affect people’s lives) re-
quires more transparency. In such situations one could
argue that parliamentary oversight committees should
be authorised to make an executive-independent deci-
sion to move scrutiny discussions from a secret and over
to a publicly accessible setting. As we have seen, nei-
ther of the two IIAs provide the EP with such possibili-
ties. Rather, in effectively putting a muzzle on them, it is
doubtful whether the EP can represent a strong enough
safeguard against unjustified executive secrecy and thus
act reliably in its role as democratic accountability forum,
even if it might want to.
5. Concluding Remarks
However one approaches questions of secrecy, trans-
parency and democratic accountability, it is important to
remember that the practice of withholding certain types
of documents and information from the public at large,
while conveying it to a selected group of parliamentar-
ians, is a well-known practice in countries all over the
world. As a result, it makes little sense to use the IIAs and
the ensuing practices only to lambast the EU for its demo-
cratic deficit. Rather, the implication of this analysis is to
point at a problem that runs through foreign policy and
external relations on a global scale, to illustrate what the
democratic dilemmas are, and why they arise and often
also persist.
The main purpose of the two IIAs discussed in this ar-
ticle, is to enhance transparency in the EU’s foreign policy
by allowing the EP (varying degrees of) access to sensi-
tive information while at the same time accommodating
the need for secrecy. It can be argued that the IIAs have
reinforced the EP’s role in EU foreign affairs, by giving it
access to information to which it was previously denied,
but this increase in power does not automatically entail
a strengthening of the EP as a democratic accountability
forum. Both IIAs (even if there are differences between
them) fail to maximise the likelihood that the plurality
of views in the EP as a whole is reproduced in the meet-
ings of the oversight committee. However, the main rea-
son is that the citizens are largely deprived of possibilities
to gauge how their elected representatives exercise their
role as guardians of executive power. As a result, the EP
risks being conceivedmore as a “runaway guardian” than
as a democratically authorised representative assembly.
Short of meeting the democratic standard, it could still
be argued that the IIAs contribute to making EU foreign
policy less prone to power abuse or badly informed de-
cisions because a more diverse set of actors are familiar
with what is going on and can raise questions and objec-
tions to avoid the pitfalls of group-think, bounded ratio-
nality etc. Thus, the net-worth of the IIAs is therefore that
they have contributed to make EU foreign affairs secrets
shallower (cf. Pozen, 2010) and in this sense less incom-
patible with democratic decision-making. At the same
time, the analysis has demonstrated how and why there
is a crucial normative difference between being able to
advance the parliamentary power base in foreign policy,
and becoming empowered to serve the citizens through
a democratic accountability forum.
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